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The Treaty of Lisbon brought many innovations into the European 
Union’s agenda, one of which is related to energy policies. The treaty came into force in 
2009; until now there has been no evaluation of its practical implementation, especially 
concerning those member states that are particularly sensitive to all the changes that 
take place in the energy sector. The thesis “INFLUENCE OF EU COMMON ENERGY 
POLICY ON LITHUANIA’S ENERGY SECURITY AFTER THE TREATY OF 
LISBON” analyses the influence of post-Lisbon European Union common energy 
policies on Lithuania’s energy security.  Using Rational Choice Institutionalism as a 
theoretical approach, the evaluation of the implementation of EU energy policies is 
done looking at how it minimizes energy security risks in its member state. The Traffic 
Light Model is used to produce the necessary classification of risks. The research is 
carried out using secondary data resources, document analysis and expert interviews. It 
can be observed that post-Lisbon policies have had a positive influence on Lithuania’s 
energy security; even the policies that are imposed by the Union are in accordance with 
Lithuania’s objectives. However, the result would be more tangible if Lithuania 
managed to take advantage of all the opportunities presented by the EU.  
Keywords: The treaty of Lisbon, common energy policy, Lithuania’s energy security, 
energy security risks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Significant changes can be witnessed in the process of European 
Integration regarding Energy policy.  Decisions are moving towards a more integrated 
EU energy policy, thus trying to create a common policy field. From a historical 
perspective, however, this policy has been based on the principle of sovereignty, mostly 
looking at the interests of the big member states such as France, Germany or Italy. This 
attitude is highly reflected in the main EU documents.  
The Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, officially establishing the 
European Union. On the one hand, this treaty was a major step towards a more 
consolidated Union and also meant an advance in common monetary policy. On the 
other hand, even though it had an important role in the integration process, the 
Maastricht Treaty established very little on energy policy. After analyzing the treaty, 
only a vague reference to common energy policy was found in the chapter ‘Trans- 
European networks’. Title 12 defines that in order to ‘enable citizens of the Union to 
derive full benefit from the setting up of an area without internal frontiers, the 
Community shall contribute to establishment and development of trans- European 
networks in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures’ and 
‘Community shall aim at promoting the interconnection and inter-operability of national 
networks...’1 In this way the Maastricht Treaty provides a timid allusion to common 
energy policy, but fails to make a firm stance on the matter. 
In 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed, which would be a step 
further to creating a more integrated Union. The main focus was given to Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), consequently dealing with new threats in the 
international arena. The solidarity clause was extended arguing that ‘the member states 
shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity’.2This is 
important, as solidarity also meant paying more attention to enhancing communication 
in the energy sector. In spite of this, no direct reference to common energy policy was 
given.  
                                                          
1
Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of the European Union 51, July 1992, <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M.html> 
2
The Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Official Journal of the European Communities, 
October 1997, < www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf> 
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The establishment of Treaty of Nice in 2001 was directly related to the 
large- scale expansion in 2004. The aim of treaty was to prepare EU institutions to work 
with a significantly larger number of member states. The Treaty of Nice established 
explicit rules on voting and regulated the distribution of votes in different EU 
institutions.
3
 Nonetheless, no changes in energy policy were defined. 
Along these lines it can be observed that before the Lisbon Treaty came 
into force no major steps were taken towards common EU energy policy. The analysis 
of the main treaties concerning EU integration has shown that the more powerful 
veteran member states did not show much initiative on the matter. This is why the 
Lisbon Treaty became a breaking point in establishing a more unified energy policy. 
It took almost eight years for The Treaty of Lisbon to come into force in 
December of 2009. This treaty is considered to be one of the main breakthroughs for 
further consolidation of the European Union (EU).The Lisbon Treaty changed every 
existing EU treaty and became the fundamental document in the Union. It brought 
significant changes to the structure of the EU by establishing new positions (such as 
High Representative and President of European Council), strengthening the power of 
the institutions (especially the European Parliament) and dealing with the problem of 
democratic deficit (by developing Citizen Initiative).This treaty is important because it 
defines the guidelines for the future EU policies, reallocates its priorities and presents 
the aims of the Union.
4
It also introduces references to relatively new challenges, such as 
climate change and energy solidarity, particularly to address concerns expressed by 
countries like Lithuania and Poland. This treaty is crucial to EU energy security 
because, for the first time, EU energy policy is widely debated in an EU document of 
such nature. It therefore establishes new means of improving the quality of EU energy 
security by, for instance, introducing an energy solidarity clause.
5
  
In general the energy policy in EU is relatively new but is a rapidly 
evolving field. This unprecedented process can be explained by three main reasons. 
                                                          
3
Treaty of Nice, Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities and Certain Related Acts, Official Journal of the European Communities, March 2001, 1-
80, <eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/.../12001C_EN.pdf>  
4T.Jakštas, Ar Lisabonos sutartis turi įtakos Europos Bendrosios eneregtikos įgyvendinimui?, Politologija 
4 (60), 2010, P.114 
5Ž. Vaičiūnas, Europos Sąjungos Bendros energetikos politikos formavimasis ir Lietuvos interesai, 
Politologija 3(55) 2009, P.87    
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Firstly, the enlargement in 2004, when EU accepted ten new member states for Central 
and Eastern Europe. Their standards in energy security were rather low when compared 
with the older member states. Secondly, the evolution of other policy fields (such as 
environment or competiveness) meant that energy policy could not just be a part of 
these policies anymore, but had to establish a new separate agenda. And finally, the 
emergence of particular problems with energy supply, such as the conflicts between 
Russia and Ukraine or Russia and Belarus which resulted in gas supply disturbances. 
6
 
The Treaty of Lisbon would constitute a call for more cooperation in order 
to eliminate risks in the field of Energy security. It is not evident, however, that the 
treaty has reached its goal. It was certainly a big step towards EU common energy 
policy and Euro optimists believed that it would bring significant changes. This being 
said, there is no obvious evidence that it succeeded to improve the situation by 
alleviating the risks that some member states are still facing. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the changes brought on by the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the actions of the EU that followed it, focusing on the effect they had on 
energy security in the member states that has low level of energy security. Using the 
principal- agent model based on the main assumptions of Rational Choice 
Institutionalism theory the main question in this thesis is formulated as follows: 
whether the European Union as an agent fulfills member states (as a principals) 
preferences in the field of common energy policy.   
Analyzed situation is best explained using the Rational Choice 
Institutional (RCI) approach. This approach is suitable for this paper as it analysis 
relations between member states and EU institutions, showing how interconnections 
between them is effecting the policy outcomes. This theory tries to explain the 
interaction between international institutions and separate actors. It argues that states 
have well defined preferences and their actions are determined by them
7
. However, 
sometimes in order to achieve their goals states cannot act alone. They have to give 
some of their power to the institution, in this way situation of principal- agent model is 
created. This model helps to schematize the relation between the state and the 
                                                          
6
 Vaičiūnas, P. 92 
7
 S. Bunse, Leadership by Lilliputians – Small State Council Presidencies in the European Union, INCAE 
Business School,  2007, P. 4     
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institution. Yet it is important to point out that there are institutions which prevent states 
to act only according to their own interests. Wiener and Diezstate argue that ‘Even 
though actors are regarded as calculative utility- maximizers it has to be emphasized the 
significance of institutional context as constrains to the strategic and rational behavior 
of actors’.8 According to RCI, institutions have the power to shape policies and states 
are not able overrule them.
9
 Institutions are perceived as the way to overcome the 
collective action dilemma and reduce the level of uncertainty between different actors.  
In this study we have a situation when the member state, having clearly defined goals in 
the energy field, are constrained by the EU institutions and have to become policy 
entrepreneurs in order to achieve their goals. In order to see how these interactions 
between EU institutions and member state are working in practice this study tries to 
define the level to which energy security risks in the member state are tackled. As small 
members states with low levels of energy security do not have enough recourse to deal 
with it alone international help is required. It is in the interest of the member state to 
abolish these risks and EU policies are understood as institutions that would benefit 
from this interest. In order to see how these relations are implemented in the real life 
there is a necessity to find a research model that would allow evaluating the principal – 
agent relations between the EU and it member state.  
The model that suits the best this work is the Traffic Light Model of 
acceptable, tolerable and intolerable risks.  It will be used to see what are the main 
issues these states facing. This model originated in Risk Governance Council, later 
similar methodologies were used in such organizations as International Country Risk 
Guidance, as well as governmental institutions (for example US Congress). Model that 
will be applied in this paper is an attempt to assess energy risk intensity in Baltic 
States.
10
The Traffic Light Model defines the factors that cause high levels of alarm in 
the field of energy security. This model includes the most relevant energy security risks 
in the Baltic States (as of today and in a 10 years perspective), identifies most urgent 
short-term and long-term risks and proposes indicators for assessment of damage and 
                                                          
8
A. Wiener, T. Diez, European integration theory, 2.ed, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009 P. 47 
9
 E. Immergut, The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism, Politics Society, 26 (5), 1998 ,P. 13 
<https://www2.sowi.hu-berlin.de/lehrbereiche/comppol/pubb/pdfs/emi1998pas.pdf> 
10
 A. Molis, Building methodology, assessing the risks: the case of energy security in Baltic States, Baltic 
Journal of Economics 11 (2), 2011, P.60 
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the probability of its occurrence
11
.The analysis of EU common energy policy will be 
carried out using these well-defined factors, by trying to assess the level to which it 
does eliminate these risks and ensure energy security in this region. It is important to 
note, that the purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the model, the main attention is 
given to the evaluation of EU policies. Model is used as a tool to reach the aim. It is 
acknowledge that there are different energy risks classifications. For example A. 
Checchi suggests a classification of security of supply risk including geopolitical, 
economic, geological, technical and environmental risks. While experts at the NATO 
Energy Security Centre of Excellence, states that risks can be classified as follows: 
technical, natural, economic, social, political and terrorist. The nature of risks can be 
very diverse, depending on in which country and geopolitical region the energy system 
is established.  That is why this particular model was chosen because it is adapted to 
particular region, where case study state is located. What is more, in order to define the 
risks in this model interviews were made in case study country with the experts in this 
field.   
The concept of “energy security” itself is complex and is as L. Chester 
argues: “inherently slippery because it is polysemic in nature, capable of holding 
multiple dimensions and taking on different specificities depending on the country (or 
continent), timeframe or energy source to which it is applied“12 This broad definition 
can bring about analytical difficulties, as it can lead to confusion in understanding what 
has been done before in the field of energy security. For example, P.L. Cornell proposes 
to define “energy security” in a national security context using a three level model of 
national security, which would include functionality of security services, functioning of 
domestic services and economic well-being.
13
Meanwhile, the Copenhagen School has 
suggested quite an innovative approach, explaining security not as a direct outcome of 
the threat, but as the political interpretation of that threat, which is more specific.
14
 
However, these definitions do not define the exact elements of energy security. For this 
                                                          
11
Molis, P.60 
12
L. Chester, Conceptualising energy security and making explicit its polysemic nature, Energy Policy, 
Volume 38, Issue 2, 2010, P. 887 
13
P. E. Cornell, Energy and Three Levels of National Security: Differentiating Energy Concerns within a 
National Security Context, The Quarterly Journal, 2009 P. 85 
14
A. V. Belyi, New dimensions of energy security of the enlarging EU and their impact on relations with 
Russia, European Integration, Vol. 25 (4), 2003, P.353 
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reason, the definition which we will consider to be most relevant to this study is given 
by the International Energy Agency (IEA). It describes the concept of energy security as 
the “uninterrupted physical availability of energy sources at an affordable price, while 
respecting environment concerns”.15 This definition relates long term energy security to 
geopolitical events and the unpredictable actions of other actors, which can sometimes 
have disastrous consequences and require a longer time period to amend. There is also 
short term energy security issue which concerns the ability of the system to deal with 
sudden changes in the energy field, such as arguments about prices or disruptions in 
supply. 
Energy security as research field has generally been receiving significant 
attention in recent decades. This is especially true when analyzing the global energy 
system and the actors operating in it. For this study, however, the most important 
investigations are those talking about energy security on a national level. These studies 
are essential for building the research model. Subsequently, the most relevant articles to 
the theoretical part of this study are those related to Rational Choice Institutionalism. 
Most of the authors we are going to be working with have already been mentioned in 
previous pages, but it is important to emphasize that RCI is not an approach that 
originated from the EU integration theories or from the energy security study field. This 
is precisely why exhaustive research concerning EU energy policy has not been done. 
To complement the theoretical part of this study, further material will be 
used for the empirical part of the research. Here we can divide the articles in three main 
areas. Firstly, the literature that is dealing with EU common energy policy such as 
articles as written by Vaičiūnas or Eikland. The second topic that is relevant to the 
empirical part of the research works with materials that discuss European Union energy 
policy after the Lisbon Treaty, for example studies made by  Braun, Andoura or Jakstas. 
However, these studies only provide theoretical assumptions about how this treaty 
should work; no practical evaluation is presented. The third package of material is case 
specific; articles are related to Lithuania’s energy security.  
Lithuania as a case study was chosen for few main reasons. As it was a 
previously mentioned, after the expansion in 2004 the new member states brought their 
                                                          
15
Molis, P. 60 
10 
 
energy dependency problems to EU level. Energy security problems in the Baltic States 
(including Lithuania) were identified in 2006 at the European Commission energy green 
paper
16. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are described as an ‘isolated energy island’, 
suggesting that from the standpoint of energy infrastructure these three states are 
isolated from other EU member states, especially in the gas sector. This means that they 
are particularly sensitive to all the changes that occur in the energy sector. From all 
Baltic States Lithuania has particularly complicated situation, closing of the Nuclear 
Power Plant (this meant more independence of gas import) and paying the highest price 
for the natural gas has decreased its levels of energy security more than in other Baltic 
States. 
One more reason why Lithuania was chosen as a case study is because it 
has been participating most actively in strengthening EU common energy policy. 
Common EU energy policy innovations are always welcomed in this country and are 
adopted adequately fast. What is more, Lithuania is also known as the most active actor 
in promoting common EU energy policy. Being highly dependent on Russia, this state is 
particularly interested in more cooperation between the members states in dealing with 
problems related to communication with its big neighbor on energy issues. In this way 
the Treaty of Lisbon offered more opportunities to Lithuania to present its national 
preferences on the European level. Parallel to this, EU institutions are affecting 
Lithuania’s policies in different ways. 
In order to achieve the aim of this paper, three main tasks are determined: 
1. To find and accommodate a research model that could be used to assess 
the effect of EU common energy policy after the Treaty of Lisbon on 
energy security of its member state. 
2. To use this research model as a base to analyze the impact of these new 
policies on Lithuania’s energy security in particular. 
3. To evaluate what implications the EU common energy policy that was 
established after the Lisbon Treaty could have on the elimination of 
energy security risks in Lithuania. 
                                                          
16
EU Commission Green Paper - A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy 
{SEC(2006) 317} 
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The dependent variable in this paper concerns energy security risks that 
Lithuania is facing, more precisely these risks will be introduced in the chapter about 
Traffic Light Model. The independent variable in this paper is the European Union 
common energy policy after the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Research will be carried out in two main parts, which are supported by 
different methodology. The first theoretical part is used to establish the research model 
based on the Traffic Light Model of acceptable, tolerable and intolerable risks. This 
model is the basis of the empirical part of the paper. The main assumption of Rational 
Choice Institutionalism will be defined as well. The contribution of this theoretical 
approach to this research will be explained. This part of the paper is prepared using 
secondary data recourses and based on descriptive method. 
The second empirical part includes the analysis of the collected data using 
the already mentioned Traffic Lights Model. Firstly, the innovations brought by the 
Treaty of Lisbon are discussed, trying to explain its effect on a member state. After this, 
using the case study of Lithuania, the analysis of EU energy policy on energy security is 
will be done. Here analytical method plays the main role, using the primary data 
(documents and interviews) case study contributes to the answering research question. 
The main legal changes that have been brought by Lisbon treaty will be unfolded after 
analysis on existing EU legal documents. However, in order to show practical influence 
of European Union decisions more data is necessary. Semi-structured qualitative expert 
interviews were carried out. Questionnaire composed of ten questions was prepared 
according to the Traffic Light Model risk classification. The interviewees were experts 
working in the field of energy policy field, mainly dealing with energy security and EU 
energy policies. Three such interviews were taken. 
The summary of the paper should provide the reader with research 
conclusions and give the answer to the research question that has been raised in this part 
of the thesis. Suggestions for further analysis will be given as well. 
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1. Rational Choice Institutionalism as a theory to define relations between member 
states and EU institutions 
1.1 Main assumptions of Rational Choice Institutionalism 
 
As was already mentioned in the introduction, the theory of Rational Choice 
Institutionalism did not originate from the European Integration theories nor is its 
approach popular in the field of study of energy security. Its growing importance in 
European Union studies, however, can be observed. In this chapter the main 
assumptions of the theory will be introduced, laying out the basis of this study. 
Subsequently, we will assess the theory, producing a fully explained critique. Finally, 
we discuss the relevance of the RCI in EU studies showing why it fits our research 
model.  
Before discussing the main themes, however, an explanation of the concept of 
institutions has to be made in order to avoid any misunderstanding. Institutions are a 
key concept in the literature of Rational Choice institutionalism, although paradoxically 
it is also the most confusing one. Institutionalists are still struggling with the definition 
of this concept and many of these definitions are applied in different lines of research. 
However, RCI has been focusing on two main interpretations and for the purpose of this 
paper the more functionalist interpretation has been chosen. According to this approach, 
institutions are perceived as the rules of the game provided by the rulers themselves.
17
 
These rules emerge as a result of the interdependence of the actors, their strategic 
interaction with each other and the collective action taken by these actors or the 
contrasting dilemmas that they face. These institutions emerge and survive because they 
fulfil important functions for the individual actors affected by these institutions.
18
 In the 
case of our research topic these rules are defined as the decisions made by the EU 
institutions that have an effect on state members. 
There are three main types of New Institutionalisms. The most relevant for this 
study is, however, the RCI, representatives of this theoretical approach argues that 
                                                          
17
K. Shepsle, Rational Choice Institutionalism, in R. Goodin, Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, 
2006, P.24 
18
J. Talberg, Ch. Jonsson, "Institutional Theory in International Relations," in Jon Pierre, B. Guy Peters & 
Gerry Stoker (eds), Debating Institutionalism, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 
2008 P. 1-30 
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utility-maximizing individuals (or, at the international level, states), acting out of self-
interest, are central actors in the political process, and that the institutions emerge as a 
result of their interdependence, strategic interaction and collective action or contracting 
dilemmas.
19
 Institutions emerge and survive, because they fulfil important functions.  
Participation is particular collective action is understood as the cost and benefit analysis. 
 As distinct from Historical or Sociological institutionalism, rational theory suggests 
functional analysis of institutions, when institution is defined according to it actual 
influence and is of direct usage of the actors aiming at the well-defined goals. RC 
institutionalists believe that institutions can have influence on policy formation. Even 
having their clear defined preferences and using their power states cannot change this.   
Although originally formulated in the context of American political institutions, RCI 
is applicable across a range of other comparative and international political context. In 
the recent years, for example, comparativists have applied this approach to the 
comparative study of the design of political institutions, the significance of the ‘veto 
points’ in public policy making and delegation of powers to independent agencies and 
courts.
20
  Latter is particularly important in this study as draws attention to the principal 
– agent model. Traditionally states are viewed as the principals, delegating functions to 
international bodies as agents. The RCI suggest another application of this model, were 
the possibility of an agent pursuing its own rather than the principal’s interests is a 
major consideration.
21
 
RCI is defined by three main premises:  1. Methodological individualism, which 
simply means that this approach explains individual and collective actions as the 
aggregation of individual choices.  Individuals are acting according to their preferences, 
which are clearly defined and exogenous. 2. Goal seeking and utility maximizing. This 
means that individuals are prone to choosing the action that is likely to maximize their 
utility. It is assumed that states with fixed preferences would carefully calculate the 
possible utility and alternative options.  3. The existence of various institutional or 
strategic constrains on individual choice. Here RCI emphasizes the institutional 
                                                          
19
Talberg, P. 5 
20
Pollack, P. 14 
21
Talberg, P. 6 
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constrains on individual behaviour, exploring how formal and informal institutions 
shape and constrain the choice of individual actors. 
There are, of course, some critics who question the empirical fruitfulness of this 
approach. 
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1.2 Limits of theory 
 
Kenneth A. Shepsle argues:‘ Self-conscious and self-imposed limits are an inherent 
part of the program so that conclusions can be stated in the confidence that they can be 
traced back to their progenitors’.22 The criticism applied to the RCI can be divided into 
two main parts. The first one derives from inside the institutional theoretical framework, 
which consists of mainly historical and sociological institutionalisms; this we will call 
the internal critiques. In this case, the main assumptions of the theory have been 
accepted, but the question of ‘rational choice’ will be discussed.  The second part of the 
critique is the one that is focused outside both institutionalism and rational choice 
approaches and will be called external critiques.  Constructivism as the second-order 
theory tends to be the most significant opponent of rational choice approaches. This 
approach doubts not only some aspects of the Rational Choice but actually identifies the 
weaknesses in the approach as whole. 
Starting with the internal critiques, the most discussed one is related to the 
rationality. Scholars argue that the assumption that actors are behaving rationally is too 
unrealistic, because it is costly on the one hand, and is constrained by cognitive 
limitations on the other.
23
 Moreover, this approach is often highly functionalist, which 
means that it gives quite questionable explanations on the origins of the institutions, 
mostly in terms of the effects that follow their foundation. In this way the persistence of 
an institution can be explained, though it should not be confused with the origins, 
because it is hard to deduce the origins from the consequences.
24
 What is more, this 
theory is largely intentionalist, which is to say that it assumes that the process of 
institutional creation is under the control of actors who have well defined intentions and 
establish institutions in order to achieve their goals. This assumption is highly criticised 
as being heroic, talking about the persistence of historical actors and their ability to 
control the course of events.
25
These considerations suggest that even though Rational 
Choice Institutionalism has big potential in explaining the relations between actors and 
                                                          
22
Shepsle, P. 35 
23
A. Lupia, and M. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, P. 1-10 
24
P. Hall, R. C. R. Taylor, Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism, Political Studies, Vol. 44 
(5) 1996 P. 963 
25
Ibid. P. 937 
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institutions, as well as why institutions still maintain their explanation of institutional 
genesis, it applies effectively only in a limited number of settings.
26
 The way out of this 
situation, as Hall argues would be that ‘a better understanding acquaintance with other 
schools (mostly sociological and historical institutionalisms) would lead the partisans of 
each toward more sophisticated appreciation for the underlying issues to be resolved 
within their own paradigm’.27 This means that by looking at how other paradigms are 
dealing with similar issues RCI could try to fix its inability to explain the origins of the 
institutions and strengthen their assumption about the rationality of the actors. 
When it comes to external critiques of Rational Choice approaches the main 
opponent here appears to be constructivism. In the field of European Union studies the 
debate between these theories replaced the traditional debates between neofunctionalism 
and intergovernmentalism. There are two main issues that constructivist see in the way 
that rational choice is operating: endogenous preference formation and change.  
By endogenous preference formation in the context of constructivism, it is 
understood that RC theorists tend to simplify assumptions about actors’ preferences. 
The actors are made exogenous to the theory, thus making no effort to explain them or 
include them in the theory as a variable
28
. It seems that rational choice denies the 
identity and socialization of the agents, the factor that might have the critical importance 
to explain the formation and the processes that they are researching in general. This 
would be the main concern of constructivists, seeing as they put identity and interest as 
the base of their studies. 
The second issue according to constructivism is the concept of change in rational 
choice. Some constructivists argue that RC is putting the main theoretical emphasis on 
stability and rather ignoring the possibility –or necessity- of change. It seems, 
specifically in the field of EU studies that even the best rational choice work shares the 
tendency to either neglect the issue of change or to attribute change exogenous shocks.
29
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Hall,  P. 20 
27
Ibid., P. 22 
28
J. Fearon, A. Wendt,  Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Sceptical View, Handbook of International 
Relations, SAGE Publications, 2002,  P. 60 
29
Pollack, 2006, P. 48 
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However, despite the obvious disagreements that both these theories face some 
authors suggest that we look at these two approaches pragmatically as analytical tool-
kits, as somewhat different approaches that bring different aspects of social life into 
focus.
30
 The debate between RC and constructivism can be beneficial to both theories; 
taking into account what either side says we can improve and refine our research. 
Obvious limitations were discussed in the chapter the relevance of RCI in the study 
of European Union affairs is undeniable. In some case given critique can be accepted 
and used as an important tool to improve the existing research base, mostly in the case 
of Constructivist criticism, for example in competitive testing, were two theories are 
pitted against each other in explaining a single event
31
. On the other hand while we do 
find some evidence of elaborate models subjected to cursory testing (or no testing at 
all), the broader picture is one in which scholars draw on rational choice theories to 
generate testable hypotheses about concrete political outcomes across a range of subject 
areas.
32
 As M. Pollack argues: ‘empirical record of these theories was positive and 
progressive even in the areas where it was considered to be outside the domain of 
applicability of the RCI’. 33 What is more RCI leads to the adoptable research model, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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1.3 Rational Choice Institutionalism in European Union Studies 
 
It has been argued recently that the literature on EU politics and policy making is 
increasingly turning from specialized theories of integration, parochial applications of 
IR or comparative tools in favour of more generic (and broadly applicable) forms of 
institutionalism.  Before this the main focus in European Union studies had been paid to 
the neofunctionalist-intergovernmentalist debate, concentrating on the importance of the 
different actors (national state and supranational institutions). The second order 
questions were left unanalysed and the basic assumptions of these theories, such as the 
relations between the agent and the structure, the logic of human behaviour and etc. had 
been left undefined. Consequently, the theories of New Institutionalism and in particular 
the Rational Choice were developed to fill in this gap.  
Rational Choice Institutionalism has spread rapidly to different fields of EU politics 
and it is no longer limited to the study of formal EU institutions. M. Pollack identifies 
five areas of European Union politics where RCI was applied as a theoretical approach 
and gave significant results. According to him legislative politics is the furthest 
developed strand of rational choice theory and its analysis is focused on three main 
questions: legislative politics within the European Parliament; the voting power of 
various states in the Council of Ministers; and the respective powers of these two bodies 
in the EU legislative process.
34
Furthermore, rational choice theories have been applied 
recently also in the studies of Europeanization, where RC introduces a mechanism 
which emphasizes the logic of consequences
35
. In the research related to public opinion 
on European integration the foundation of the research was investigated based on the 
calculation of tangible economic benefits from integration.
36
 
However, the most relevant developments for this study are related to the research 
of EU executive politics. These studies focus on a principal-agent theoretical model 
with the aim of pursuing two main questions. Firstly, the analysis of what could be the 
reasons for the principals (in this case member states) to delegate their powers to agents 
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(supranational bodies), and secondly, looking if the agent is fulfilling the task it is given 
and is not diverging from the preferences of the principal. As already said in the 
introduction this research will try to look at the changing dynamics of EU energy policy 
and see whether the European Union institutions are acting like agents or if, on the 
contrary, they have the power to change the policy lines and reverse the principal-agent 
relations. 
In general the principal-agent model has been increasingly applied in the study of 
the European Union
37
 because this model holds significant promise for understanding 
the complex relationships and interactions that characterise the Union. It has the 
advantage over traditional theories of integration, as it has greater institutional 
sensitivity.
38
 This growing popularity is directly correlated with the rise of Rational 
Choice Institutionalism, which makes the most sophisticated use of principal-agent 
model in the research field of European Union,  especially in analysing the conditions 
under which ‘supranational institutions will be delegated authority and will enjoy 
autonomy from and exert influence on the member governments of the Community’.39 
The principal-agent model according the RCI assumption will be explained later in this 
chapter. First of all a more detailed description of this model is required. 
The principal-agent model originated from the new economics of organization 
approach. It is used to examine the relations inside the firm. Put simply, agency 
relations are taking place when one party, the principal, enters the contractual agreement 
with the second, the agent, and delegates to the latter responsibility for carrying out a 
function or set of tasks on the principal’s behalf.40 Looking further than economic 
approaches, the principal-agent model can be explained as delegated responsibility from 
one individual or organization to another in order to minimize the transaction costs and 
reach the goals that would be costly or ineffective to do themselves. In the context of 
European Union studies, the role of principal is given to the member states, while EU 
institutions are perceived as the agent. This model is inspired by the rational choice 
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approaches and it helps us understand why member states give some of their powers to 
supranational institutions. In the case of this study Lithuania is giving up their freedom 
to operate in the sphere of energy policy, delegating its functions in this area to the 
European Union institutions.  
A number of scholars have examined the reasons why states transfer their powers to 
the supranational bodies. The most popular explanation is the intention to minimize 
transaction costs. However, there are few other opinions about the motivations and the 
reasons that make the delegation of powers worthwhile: 
 Supranational agents may solve problems resulting from incomplete 
information by providing decision-makers with the technical information 
they need, in particular when complex issues rise.
41
 
 The creditability of the commitments adopted at the supranational level is 
ensured by monitoring the states’ compliance with joint decisions. In this 
case the monitoring is done to overcome the problem of collective action 
where actors anticipate benefits from long term co-operation.
42
 
 Delegation gives an opportunity to displace responsibility for unpopular 
decisions.
43
 
 To help resolving of the problem of instability in policy-making. Giving the 
agenda setting powers to the agent prevents possible turbulences in the 
majoritarian decision making.
44
 
The difficulties that rise inside the principal-agent model are related to the 
agents’ effectiveness in pursuing the goal that was it given. The principal is not 
protected from the agent exercising their own agenda. This situation might occur 
because of the asymmetric distribution of information that favours the agent. This 
advantage can allow the agent to engage in opportunistic behaviours that may be 
difficult for the principal to detect.
45
The fear that the principal may have here is that 
agent could became a rival in the contest of political leadership. In the case of European 
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Union the delegation of the powers of one member state to the supranational bodies 
might result in the loss of powers in favour of the agent or other member states which 
have more power on the EU institutions. This behaviour in principal-agent literature is 
described as ‘agency drift’, when agents might pursue the political agenda that differs 
from that of the principal. What is more, a situation may arise where the agencies are 
somehow captured by one of the principal’s institutional rivals in the leadership contest 
and could face the possibility of having its preferences significantly decreased.
46
 
The combination of the aforementioned RCI assumptions and the basic 
characteristics of Principal – Agent model are demonstrated in the Scheme 1. This 
scheme shows the relations that might be established between the ES member state and 
its institutions. In the particular case of Lithuania, the country has well established 
preferences to increase their energy security levels. However, because of its small size, 
special geographical location and political reasons it cannot by itself implement these 
goals. International support is required, which is why from the very beginning of its 
membership Lithuania was actively participating in creating common energy policy and 
uploading their national preferences to the EU. Giving more powers to the supranational 
bodies eventually means losing the freedom to manoeuvre. 
However, Lithuania is willing to go further: the question here is whether the EU 
as an agent is fulfilling expected goals. It could be that these institutions are either 
pursuing their own agenda or acting according to the will of other more influential 
member states. The question is whether Lithuania should still continue its active 
lobbying in the field of EU common energy policy or should try to find other ways to 
ensure its energy security. These assumptions led to the main question raised in the 
introduction of this work. As it was mentioned in the introduction, this approach is 
dealing with the relationship dynamics between the member state and EU institutions, 
which has the key role in this research. 
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Scheme No. 1 designed by the author using main assumptions of RCI and characteristics of 
principal-agent model.  
Thus there is strong argumentation of why Rational Choice Institutionalism is 
the most acceptable theoretical approach to explain the question that is tackled in this 
paper. As it help to build a background for empirical part of the thesis as well as leads to 
the choosing particular model for the purpose of this paper.  In order to see if European 
Union is implementing Lithuania’s preferences there is a need to have clear indicators 
for evaluation. Traffic Light Model shows the risks that are threatening Lithuania’s 
energy security. Analysing EU energy policies after the treaty of Lisbon influence on 
minimizing these risks would allow seeing if EU is acting as an agent or creating its 
own agenda.  
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2. Traffic Light Model: The way to indicate Lithuania’s energy security risks 
 
From the very beginning of its membership in EU Lithuania has shown a strong 
interest in developing a Common European Energy policy. Lithuania perceives EU 
energy policy as the key instrument for increasing its energy security and consequently 
it is interested in adopting EU energy policy according to its priorities,
47
 a fact which is 
quite obvious when looking into the priorities of Lithuania’s Presidency.48 Energy 
policy is the top priority for those six months and two main goals were established: 1) 
the creation of an internal energy market with sufficient infrastructure to synchronize 
with the European networks, and 2) the strengthening of the external dimension of 
energy policy.
49
 The implementation of these goals should lead to strengthening energy 
market from the inside and help to avoid energy island in Europe, as well as, to enhance 
the external energy policy and to have it coordinate in all levels. Taking into account all 
the priorities that Lithuania has been set it can be argued that this policy field perfectly 
fits the principal-agent model based on the assumptions of Rational Choice 
Institutionalism, which mean that Union’s energy policies can be analysed in the 
framework of RCI. 
Energy security is Lithuania’s well defined goal and it perceives EU policies as a 
way to ensure it. The task here is to see whether giving power to the EU pays back and 
whether there actually is a substantial effect on Lithuania’s energy security. To get the 
necessary results, a suitable methodology should be created and proper indicators for 
the evaluation need to be determined. It seems that the Traffic Light Model suits the aim 
of this paper, but before discussing it in more detail the concept of energy security risk 
should be explained, as this concept is essential in the research model. As all definitions 
in political science, the definition of “risk” is complex and is a source of different 
discussions. Simply put, it can be characterised as “the chance of injury, damage, or 
loss.” However, according to Paul Slovic, this definition carries the assumption that the 
risk can be objectively quantified by risk assessment, which is misleading because risk 
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itself is inherently subjective.
50
 That is why the concept of risk in this paper is defined 
as the possible threat to the society in the minds of the people, not arguing whether it 
actually exists or not. 
The chosen model for this research will use the aforementioned concept of risk. This 
model was created originally to identify the most relevant short and long-term energy 
security risks in the Baltic States and to introduce indicators for damage assessment and 
the probability of occurrence. This model, however, can also serve as a tool to study the 
effectiveness of the policy itself. In this particular case these clearly defined factors 
allow us to evaluate the levels of EU energy policy implementation in Lithuania and 
establish conclusions on the policy’s effects on Lithuania’s energy security. Analysing 
EU policies on every identified security risk step by step will show the level on which 
these policies influence the occurrence of these risks and to which degree they can be 
considered a threat or not.  In this way the evaluation of the European Union institutions 
as the agent fulfilling Lithuania’s interest will be made. Seeing if EU is acting as an 
agent or the positions have been reversed, and now Lithuania has to work according 
Unions preference. 
 As has already been mentioned in this chapter, Lithuania has strongly established 
its interest in securing the country’s energy sector. And that is why it is advocating for 
more united Energy security policies in the Union, in this way losing the possibility to 
act independently in this sector.  This analysis should demonstrate whether having these 
high hopes in the EU is being realistic or whether they should be giving more attention 
to other possible ways to ensure that security. 
Even though the Traffic Light Model was created for all Baltic States it can also be 
applied only to Lithuania. Being a part of this region, Lithuania is probably the most 
sensitive to energy security risks, differing from Latvia,
51
 which has better 
infrastructure, and Estonia, which enjoys its own energy resources. Table 1 shows all 
the short long-term energy security risks that Lithuania can face. These risks are divided 
according to the damage they can cause and the likelihood of them happening. In order 
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to proceed with the empirical part of the paper, every one of those security risks should 
be discussed first in more detail so that the changes taken place after the Lisbon treaty 
can be identified. It is also important to note that in the course of characterizing energy 
security risks of Baltic States, evidence on materialisation of risks into concrete 
damaged were collected and analysed, and experts were asked to give their evaluation 
on these issues
52
. The in- depth explanation of all energy security risk groups now will 
be provided. 
As is shown in Table 1, the third part of the model, in green, demonstrates the 
“acceptable” risks.  According to the International Risk Governance Council 
“acceptable” refers to “an activity where the remaining risks are so low that additional 
efforts for risk reduction are not seen as necessary”.53However, that does not necessarily 
mean that this issue should be abandoned and not tackled. It can be agreed that these 
issues concerning the energy sector do not threaten Lithuania’s energy or national 
security at alarming levels but, on the other hand, even smaller deficiencies in energy 
infrastructure might cause trouble in the state and prevent it from functioning normally, 
sooner or later. This risk is being defined as acceptable because it is acknowledge in 
Lithuania that energy infrastructure in country is in a good condition and it has 
overcapacity, which is why it is most unlikely to cause the greatest damage to energy 
security. On the other hand, few examples of insufficiency of infrastructure can be 
given.  
Lithuania has a history of events that resulted in disruptions of energy 
supply because of technical reasons. For example in 2005 after the effects of hurricane 
Erwin more than 230 000 people were left without electricity and it took more than 24 
hours to re-establish the energy supply to all consumers. Similar situations, albeit in 
smaller ratios, continue to this day. It has been predicted that if conditions do not 
change the frequency of similar problems will increase in the future. Moreover, this 
situation not only causes dissatisfaction in society, but it is also financial issue, and this 
would not be such a big problem if the electricity sector would be properly maintained 
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and managed.  Natural disasters pose a risk to newly build or planned info structures 
and power transmission lines will suffer increased damage if not renovated.
54
 
Risks that are marked with the yellow colour are defined as “tolerable”, 
which describes an activity that is seen as worth pursuing yet requiring additional 
efforts for risk reduction within reasonable limits.
55
This means that these risks needs to 
be minimized, however it can be done in a longer period with rational cost-benefit 
analysis and reasonable amount of resources.  In this model two such risks were 
presented.  
The first one risk factor placed under tolerable risks is the low level of 
innovations in the energy sector. The problems are basically related to the use of 
renewable energy in the state. Looking at the statistics Lithuania is at a higher level than 
the EU average, though falling behind its neighbours Latvians and Estonians.   What is 
more, according to Lithuania's National Energy Strategy
56
 by the year 2020 the share of 
renewable energy in the total energy consumption should be more than 20 per cent. But 
it seems that Lithuania is behind the planned schedule. There are few reasons why the 
acceptance of new innovations in the energy sector does not generate the expected 
support. Firstly, the lack of finances to support necessary infrastructure can be observed. 
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Table1. Lithuanian energy security risks 
 
Energy security 
risk 
 
Situation in Lithuania Questions pertinent to the analysis 
Intolerable Risks 
Dependence on 
a single supplier 
Alternative supply routes are pracatically 
impossible to establish due to the absence of 
energy towards Northern or Western Europe. 
What are the EU policies for the further 
integration of all member states into the 
energy system? How does it work in 
practice? 
Lack of 
transparency, 
experience and 
competence 
Lack of professionals skilled in political and 
technical energy security aspects as well as there 
being a shortage of objective and unbiased 
research in this area. 
In which ways could EU increase the 
levels of competence and expertise in 
Lithuania? Are there any measures 
being taken to address this issue? 
Tolerable Risks 
Lukewarm 
attitude towards 
innovations 
Insufficient application of energy innovations 
can cause deficient increase of renewable in 
energy consumption. 
How do EU policies towards more 
renewable energy consumption work in 
Lithuania? 
Vertical 
integration in 
energy sector 
Few energy companies have exclusive rights to 
import resources, control the distribution 
networks and supply consumers with gas, oil 
and electricity. 
What are the steps that the EU took to 
avoid this situation and has it been 
effective in practice? 
Acceptable Risks 
Vulnerable 
energy 
infrastructure 
Imperfect energy infrastructure causing 
disruptions in power supply (usually caused by 
natural disasters). 
Does Lithuania get any support from the 
EU funds to improve its infrastructure? 
Are there any other means that the EU 
may be using? 
 
 
 Renewable energy requires big investments in infrastructure during the 
first years of its appliance, which makes the price of renewable energy unattractive for 
Source: A. Molis, Building methodology, assessing the risks: the case of energy security in Baltic States, Baltic Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2011 
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consumers, who prefer the cheaper traditional energy sources
57
.  Secondly, renewable 
energy is a comparatively new phenomenon in Lithuania, which is why insufficient 
information is provided so that consumers could gain knowledge about it. Consumers 
do not have enough information about possible energy options. Moreover, the 
companies that usually provide renewable energy are small and do not have sufficient 
resources to negotiate with most of the consumers, which causes them to be unable to 
compete with big energy providers. Transaction costs are important here a here as well. 
In general, the situation in Lithuania is not alarming. On the other hand, there are 
spheres that require improvement.  
The last tolerable risk in Lithuania’s energy security is vertical integration 
of energy sector, which means that very few companies control the import, distribution 
and supply of energy recourses. For example in the gas sector “Gazprom” is the only 
gas supplier to Lithuania. What is more, natural gas is only transported via the Minsk-
Vilnius-Kaliningrad pipeline, which is also controlled by “Gazprom”. Finally, the same 
company is one of the biggest stockholders of the main Lithuanian gas operator 
“Lietuvos dujos”.58 Lithuania does not have any gas storage facilities or the possibility 
to distribute large amounts of liquid natural gas. Connection with Latvia (Kirmenai) is 
not a solution here, as it is only used as an emergency in case of disruption of gas 
supplies and its capacity to distribute large amount of the natural gas is rather low. All 
these factors result in the uncontrolled price rises for gas
59
. It is argued that Lithuania 
and the other Baltic states are not paying the market prices, but political prices for the 
gas (for example, in 2010 Lithuania was paying 356 USA dollars for each 1000 square 
meters of gas, while Germany only 271 dollars
60
). The compassion of Gazprom prices is 
provided in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Gazprom gas prices in some of the EU member states for 2010-2011 
Country Price for one thousand cubic meters 
($) 
Germany 271 
Netherlands  302 
Austria 304 
Romania 304 
France 306 
Estonia 309 
Latvia 310 
Italy 331 
Hungary 348 
Lithuania 356 
Sources: Ministry of Energy of Republic of Lithuania, Russian news agency “Interfax”, Ukrainian portal 
from-ua.com 
There are no connections with the alternative European networks to get supply from 
other resources in the case of a crisis. “Gazprom” owning the “Lietuvos dujos” does not 
allow the Lithuanian government to implement policies that would be against the 
Russian company’s interests.  As Lithuania does not have the possibility to receive gas 
from other sources or contain its own gas supply, it makes the country extremely 
vulnerable to the gas supply cuts.  
The top part of the table consist of the indicators that can cause the 
greatest damaged to Lithuanian energy security. “Intolerable” risks define situations 
where the risk source should be abandoned or replaced or, in cases where this is not 
possible, the vulnerabilities need to be reduced or exposure should be restricted.
61
 This 
group of risk causes the greatest danger to the state energy or even national security.   In 
Lithuania the most alarming examples of intolerable risk situations seem to be the 
dependence on a single supplier and imperfect decision making process. The first one 
is related to the human factor and the current political situation, which can be used as a 
political tool in international matters. Lithuania does not have any other alternative 
suppliers and it finds itself in a situation where the supply of natural gas, for example, 
may be limited or stopped without any notification or negotiation. In general, 
Lithuania’s dependence on Russia was acute since the restoration of independence, and 
it got more pronounced when the Russian government started to use its energy 
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companies as a foreign policy tool. Lithuanians felt this in 2006 when the government 
controlled Russian company “Rosneft” was prevented of buying the Mazeikiai oil 
refinery, which was then sold to the Polish firm “PKN Orlen”. After an agreement was 
reached, the Russian state-owned oil Transport Company “Transneft” announced that 
part of the “Druzhba” pipeline that supports Mazeikiai was temporarily shutting down 
for repairs following the oil leak. Later the pipeline was not reopened. Mazeikiai oil 
refinery was forced to receive oil from Butinge terminal which is more expensive than 
getting through the pipes.  Critics argued that Russia was manipulating energy supplies 
once again to punish Lithuania for seeking to diversify ownership in its energy sector.
62
 
This energy security risk might have caused severe damage to Lithuanian energy 
security and must be taken into account as a very serious issue.  
The second energy security risk that is marked red in this traffic light 
model is related to the lack of transparency, experience and competence in the 
decision making in this country. This is a very important area where the government 
fails to ensure the implementation of projects contributing to the proper maintenance of 
functioning infrastructure installations, the development of alternative resources or 
energy efficiency projects.
63
Very often it is a result of high level of corruption. The 
energy sector, with its complex mix of public and private actors and often enshrined 
centres of monopoly power, is prone to corruption. With considerable monopoly rents at 
stake (from meter reading, to project implementation) and, in many countries, a long 
history of weak monitoring, low transparency and inadequate civil service pay, 
opportunities and incentives for illicit activities gain rife.
64
 This leads to public sectors 
inability to implement energy projects in this way preventing possible increase in states 
energy security.  Lithuania “satisfies” all the criteria listed above and, having been part 
of the Soviet Union, where corruption was perceived as a natural form of behaviour, it 
now finds it difficult to relinquish old habits. The extent of the problem and its 
relevance is shown by the fact that the top priority in the fight against corruption in the 
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country is the energy sector, as it was announced by the   Special Investigation Service 
of Republic of Lithuania.  
Even though corruption in Lithuania was steadily decreasing after the 
restoration of independence and the levels of corruption were lower than in the health 
care sector or in the system of interior, it still exists and prevents any significant 
changes or progress to take place. The other problem is that the public sector tends to 
neglect the opinion of experts in the field of energy policy. In other words, decisions in 
this policy field are mostly political and do not take into account the opinion of the 
experts in this field. Too often not a single representative of a think tank, academic or 
research institutions, is able to assess the threats or the risks to the energy security 
formulated by politicians. The solutions offered by them from the expert point of view 
are included in the task force’s drafting of national energy security strategies, with other 
long term effects.
65
 This usually results in unreasonable decisions that only end up 
taking into account the current situation, lacking a future long-term perspective. 
Moreover, this leads to possible corruption in the public service, when strange decisions 
are not based on any scientific grounds. This causes mistrust and dissatisfaction in 
society, which lead to the opposition to the energy security projects such as building of 
a new nuclear power plant. High levels of corruption and lack of competence very often 
might be the main reasons of Lithuania’s inability to ensure its own energy security and 
eliminate risks. Taking into account all the facts mentioned above the research model 
for this paper is established.  
The Traffic Light Model defines the energy security risks in Lithuania. 
Changes in the factors that have been explained above will facilitate the evaluation of 
the effect of Common EU energy policy after Lisbon treaty on Lithuania’s energy 
security and will demonstrate whether the EU’s contribution in this area fulfils 
Lithuania’s main objectives. Step by step all these risks will be discussed in the next 
chapters trying to see how they are tackled by post- Lisbon EU policies i.e. by the 
decisions of the EU institutions,  the expected result is to see if they DO or NOT have 
influence on each risk and eventually on all Lithuania’s energy security. But before that 
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some general overview of EU energy policies and Lisbon treaty reforms will be done in 
order to have better understanding of the processes that are taking place in EU. 
2.1 Limitations of the Traffic Light Model 
 
Even though this model has been created particularly for the Baltic States 
and, with a few corrections, fits the Lithuanian energy security risk classification, there 
are few shortcomings that have to be taken into account while using it in this research. 
The Traffic Light Model is focused on political questions and leaves economic issues 
aside. In this way there is the probability that it might not consider hidden risks and 
costs.  For example, business and price risks in the gas market, as it can be exposed to 
serious volatilities related to price hikes. Patrick Heather, for instance, argues that it is 
most likely to be in in the gas sector where there will be limited numbers of very liquid 
and traded hubs, used for risk management purposes and used to set gas prices in their 
region; and there will be the national hubs, with a tight price correlation to the regional 
hubs.  As he states, this shows that some hubs are being used for price risk management 
whereas others are being used simply to balance shippers’ portfolios66. This shows that 
even building new infrastructure in the energy sector will not necessarily lead to the 
creation of a market and subsequently increase state energy security. In relation to this, 
there could also be a high possibility of price instability in the local level hubs, in this 
way causing turbulence in the national energy market and overall in the state financial 
system. On the other hand, the author of this model has clearly stated that he was not 
aiming to explain all the methodological aspects of the energy security evaluation. The 
Traffic Light Model includes neither econometric modelling nor precise calculations or 
detailed descriptions and the further research should take this into account. However, 
the conclusions on the relevant risks, their weight, probability of occurrence and 
possible damage are based on expert opinions in the region, that is to say, based on their 
insight expressed during the structured interviews
67
.  That is why the model should be 
accepted as undoubtedly having a certain level of reliability. 
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3. EU Common Energy Policy and innovations brought by the Treaty of Lisbon 
3.1 Development of Energy policies before the Treaty of Lisbon 
 
In order to see how the EU’s common energy policy after the treaty of 
Lisbon has influenced Lithuania’s energy security it is important to understand how this 
policy has been working all over the Union and which were the most important 
innovations that were included in the treaty. This information will give us a better 
understanding not only of the main processes that are taking place at the moment but 
also of which historical events led to the EU’s current situation.  
As was mentioned before in this paper, Energy policy is quite a new field 
in the EU framework. Before the Lisbon treaty came into effect in 2009, this policy was 
usually an integral part of other EU policies, such as environment or trans-European 
networks. Here we can see that there has been a definite change in the EU’s focus on 
energy policy, considering that in its early stages it used to deal mostly with issues 
related to energy policy. The treaty establishing the Coal and Steal Community in 1951 
aimed to boost economic development and start a new age of co-operation. It should be 
noted, however, that the principles of the treaty were a sign of times when Europe had 
sufficient energy resources – mostly in the form of gas and coal – and did not have to 
deal with the dependence of third countries external to the treaty.
68
 Later the situation 
drastically changed as the necessity of energy resources increased significantly and the 
usage of coal was decreased because of its damaging effect to environment. This is 
when the policies related to the energy sector established in this treaty started to lose 
relevance and bigger commitments were deemed necessary.  
The treaties that created The European Economic Community and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) both came into existence in 1957. The 
first one was established as a means to guarantee peace, but no reference to energy 
security policies was mentioned, as it did not define any policies towards a more 
rational use of resources or give any instruction to the Community institutions on how 
to work on this matter. The second one, in turn, can be described as the main obstacle 
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for the future development of EU energy policies. The reason for this perspective is that 
nuclear energy, while being perceived as an energy resource, was supposed to ensure 
the necessary level of security in Europe even though it would require involvement 
from third countries.
69
 “The aim of the Treaty was to create the conditions necessary to 
develop a powerful nuclear industry, which would provide extensive energy resources 
and would lead to the prosperity of the people.”70However, the interesting fact about 
this treaty is that the task of securing materials for the production of nuclear energy was 
given to the Community’s institutions, which would mean that member states could 
only receive materials from the third countries with the approval of the Commission. No 
stipulation was ever included in the treaty to provide EU institutions with the task of 
supplying oil and gas from third countries. 71This clearly shows that the aforementioned 
energy source was to become the main energy type in Europe. The plan, however, had 
not been laid out effectively. The emphasis on this type of energy gradually shifted due 
to “the appearance of potential dangers in its production and the use of negative effects 
that any accident could have, especially to environment”.72 As already mentioned in the 
introduction, the following treaties did not refer to energy issues in their text, but they 
were given some attention in sections concerning other EU policy fields.  
Looking at the history of the development of Europe’s energy resources 
we can see that coal lost its importance very fast, which meant that the Coal and Steal 
Community lost its main reason for functioning. Later the same happened to the 
Euratom, as nuclear energy did not deliver the results that had been expected. Europe 
entered a new period where oil and gas became the main energy resources, which also 
meant increased dependence on third countries and a weakening of EU energy security. 
The Community started losing competence in the generation of energetic resources 
which had, until then, reached considerable development, especially in coal or nuclear 
energy. This happened not because of lack of will from Community’s part, but because 
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initiatives progressed very slowly in trying to agree on common interests for all member 
states.
73
 
Some attempts, however, were made. For example, the 1996 Electricity 
and the 1998 Gas Directives known as the ‘first package’, which unfortunately did not 
lead to any tangible results. There was no true liberalisation in the sector, which was 
characterized by vertically integrated companies dominating national electricity 
production and/or gas imports, often with de jure or de facto monopolies over delivery 
infrastructure
74
. The second package in 2003, which aimed to have fully opened Gas 
and Electricity markets by 2004 and 2007 respectively, also failed to reach the desired 
outcome. Therefore, the Commission had to admit finally that the objectives of creating 
real choice for the consumer and establishing fair and free cross-border trade were not 
achieved.
75
 This situation led to the negotiation and adoption of a third package in 2009. 
This package will be discussed in more detail in later chapters as its adoption is already 
included in post-Lisbon period. As we can see, overall, market liberalization and the 
building of common Energy Policy with the objective of strengthening EU institutions 
were not very successful before the Treaty of Lisbon came into force.  
Furthermore, the issue of energy had been avoided during the 
establishment of the EU’s Security Strategy. The strategy adopted in 2003 did not 
include energy security in the threat assessment and was mainly dominated by the 
aftermath of 9/11
76
. However, much has changed since then. During the informal 
European Council of October 2005 that took place in Hampton Court, various EU 
leaders agreed that the Union needed a common Energy Policy.
77
 An increase of new 
initiatives could be observed since that meeting and energy issues became a part of the 
agenda in different meetings and discussions. The Commission published the Green 
Paper in March of 2006, a document that dealt with numerous policies. The October 
2006 Communication concerned ‘External energy relations – from Principles to 
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Actions,’ while the January 2007 Communication produced ‘An Energy Policy for 
Europe, the 2007-2009 Action Plan of the European Council and the second Strategic 
Energy Review of November 2008.’ The Lisbon Treaty then came into force in 2009. 
In general the growing interest in energy issues has been observed 
particularly in the period of 2005-2006, which can be considered the point when the 
consolidation of common EU energy policy has its roots. This timing was mainly 
influenced by the enlargement in 2004 and by the supply crises that took place due to 
the conflicts between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and Russia and Belarus in 2007. The 
following chapters will discuss the main innovations brought by the Lisbon Treaty and 
its implementation in the EU, as this is the starting point where EU Energy policy 
became a part of the official EU agenda, formalised in the main document of European 
Union. 
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3.2 Innovations brought by Lisbon Treaty 
 
Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009. It meant to be main document 
establishing the work of the Union. In general it has the basis of Constitutional Treaty 
which did not come into force because of the unsuccessful referendum in France and 
Netherlands. Already then the need for more consolidation in shaping and implement 
energy policies was established. Article 194 TFEU in Lisbon treaty was given to the 
energy. For the first time in the history of EU, common EU energy policy was 
established in such important EU legal document. It aimed to determine the main goals 
for the EU energy policy.  Not everyone was keen on having stronger focus on EU 
common Energy Policy in the treaty. The diversity of interest made the negotiation 
complicated. Decision was difficult to make, because of the different situation in the 
member states. Countries have different levels of dependence on suppliers from third 
countries, separate energy balance structures as well as different sizes energy companies 
and levels of their dominance in energy sector. One more important feature dividing 
states is their geopolitical location.
78
 These aspects mainly led to complication 
formation of EU policies in the Lisbon Treaty. Member states can be divided into three 
main parts according to their separate opinions towards Energy policies in the treaty. 
This division can be seen in Table 3. 
 
States that approved almost 
all energy policy provision 
in the Lisbon Treaty  
States that partly approved 
the energy policy 
provisions in the Lisbon 
Treaty 
States that opposed to 
almost all energy policy 
provisions in the Lisbon 
Treaty  
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, 
UnitedKingdom 
The Netherlands, Poland, 
The Czech Republic  
Germany, France 
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New member states like Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as well as some old 
members Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, and Spain strongly supported 
the energy policy provisions in the Lisbon Treaty and included development and 
consolidation of this policy into the list of priority areas.
79
 Baltic States were 
particularly sensitive to this topic because their dependence on single supplier. It is 
worth noticing that even though Poland goes in to second section, but mostly because of 
its efforts the principle of solidarity was expanded to situations related to problems of 
supplying the resources. Also Polish negotiators supported double majority voting 
system in this way trying to secure acceptance from Germany and other states for the 
questions of energy security.
80
 Even so, Germany and France were two countries which 
opposed the most to some of the provision in the treaty, this is explained by 
unwillingness to liberalize energy market and dissolve their energy champions. This 
means that the small member states might have to deal with the strong opposition from 
these countries in their attempts to ensure their energy security.  
After this quite complicated beginning and negotiations we have energy 
policy brought to the whole community level. Previsions established in the Lisbon 
treaty can be divided in two main groups. Firstly, the normative changes when EU 
common Energy policy becomes an official EU policy established in the main 
document. Secondly, practical changes: reform of voting mechanism, established main 
goals in energy field and extinction of article on solidarity.  
Liberalization of voting threshold from unanimity to qualified majority 
voting increases the efficiency of decision making. In this way conditions for faster EU 
energy policy integration are created.
81
 This innovation is also beneficial to small 
member states such as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Now these states have more 
possibilities to participate in formation of energy policies and to go around domination 
of the big member states. Clear rules and set mechanism of responsibility gives an 
impulse for more cooperation and avoid free riding problem.
82
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Expansion of Solidarity clause to the energy security area is one more 
important change showing that EU has a will to overcome the problems related to 
energy supply. Essential innovation in new treaty is direct reference to new power of 
Council. Council using the solidarity clause can decided what actions should be taken, 
considering present economic situation, if serious problems with energy supply occur.
83
 
However, experts argue that wording used in this article is not clear. In general one of 
the main shortcomings of the treaty is insufficient conceptualization, which can cause 
problems in initiating common EU actions.
84
For example the concept of solidarity 
might be interpreted in many ways. 
But main novelty in the Treaty of Lisbon is Title XXI, with its 
comprehensive Article 194 TFEU. This article established EU aims in pursuing Unions 
policy on energy. In the spirit of solidarity four main aims were determined: a) ensure 
the functioning of the energy market; b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union, 
c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and 
renewable forms of energy; d) promote the interconnections of energy networks.
85
 
These aims have more of a normative nature that real actions plan for the future 
development of EU.  At the time of Lisbon treaty came into force it was not clear what 
practical influence this article will have. Even though every country would gain 
something if everything would be fulfilled. Other argue that competence conferred upon 
the Union in December 9 is not a sea-change in the substantive priorities of EU energy 
policy, but rather a codification of the policy process that preceded it.
86
 
What we can sum up here is that treaty of Lisbon brought some normative 
and practical changes in EU energy policy. However it was not evident how all these 
changes should work in practice. The Article 194 had to be loaded with some kind of 
content. Next part of the paper will try to see how much was in post- Lisbon period.  
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The question after Lisbon treaty came in to force was whether it will have 
any practical influence to EU energy policies or it will stay just idealistic statement. 
Observers were missing clear strategy how to ensure energy security, liberalize market, 
reach diversification of supply and establish the usage of renewables.
87
 The picture 
became even more pessimistic looking at action of different member states, they were 
very often contradicting to provisions in the treaties. Very often the ideas of solidarity 
an creation of common market is forgotten, as it happened in the case of ‘NordStream’ 
gas pipeline directly connecting  Russia and Germany, bypassing Baltic States and 
Poland. Or for example the situation when during gas crisis between Russia and 
Ukraine leaders of the member states used their personal connections to negotiate with 
Kremlin
88
. These examples show that states are polarized while dealing with energy 
security problems. That is why there was no surprise that the attitudes towards 
innovation were not very optimistic. However, it seems this was not the only obstacle 
that these provisions in the treaty faced.  
“After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the 
new legal basis was supposed to create the momentum for a grand launch of revamped 
EU energy policy. Initially this momentum was lost due to the Arab Spring and the 
sovereign debt crisis, which pushed energy policy down the priority list of EU 
leadership.”89 
 In the beginning the intention was to put energy issues to the top level, 
November 2010 Commission introduced Communication on ‘Energy strategy for 2020’ 
this was followed by the European Council meeting which supposed to discuss energy 
issues on February 2011. Even though some decision in this field was taken, most of the 
discussion concerned the crises that EU and world was facing at that time.
90
 The 
discussions then shifted to ministerial level, on February 28 2011 Energy Council 
adopted conclusions which endorsed the Energy 2020 program.
91
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 Later that year, the same Energy Council drafted Conclusions on 
strengthening the external dimension of EU energy policy. Council tried to find a way 
for more coherent cooperation between member states and the Union.
92
 European 
Council adopted this Decision establishing EU- Member State relationship on 4 October 
2012
93
. As it can be observed, more active legislation process took place after Lisbon 
treaty came into force, even though it did not achieved as much political attention as 
expected. Next few paragraphs will dedicated for review of these main documents that 
were established in Post-Lisbon time. 
In the Energy 2020 strategy Commission makes few strong claims as 
regards both the subsidiarity of the EU actions (Article 5.3 TEU) and the need for 
loyalty between the EU and its Member States (Article 4.3 TEU). It basically states that 
Union can more effectively defend energy security in Europe, than separate states can, 
and they also should overstep national interest and be more loyal for the common EU 
interest.
94
 On subsidiarity Commission is quite ambitious: “The EU is the level at which 
energy policy should be developed.  Decisions on energy policy taken by one Member 
State inevitably have an impact on other Member States” or “The time has come for 
energy policy to become truly more European.”95 This strategy was one of the biggest 
steps in energy policy in post- Lisbon period. In the next chapters we will try to see if it 
has any practical influence in energy security to be precise to security of Lithuania.  
One more important document was already mentioned ‘Energy Decision’, 
approved by European Council in October 4, 2012. There are two main objectives that 
this instrument can pursue, one legal and one political. The legal interest implies 
ensuring that the bilateral agreements of Member States do not violate the principles 
which are essential to the proper functioning of the internal market.
96
 The political 
challenge is that Member States agreements substantively take into account ‘Union 
interest’ to ensure the security of supply for all 27 states as one and collaborate with 
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Unions institutions.
97
 Even though the idea behind this Decision is very significant, 
some limitations are set. Member States have few ways how to avoid information 
exchange mechanisms: by utilizing non-binding agreements, and by arguing that that 
the agreement does not impact the internal market or EU security of supply.
98
 As this 
decision is relatively new, its influence in our research would not be noticeable. 
However it should be taken into account.    
Some comments of implementation of Lisbon treaty can be made in this 
chapter as it concerns all Union in general. For example it seems that solidarity remains 
week, evidence of this is Regulation No. 994/2010/EU on the security of gas supply 
adopted in 2010. The aspect of solidarity had to be improved, but despite the fact that 
this regulation brought more harmonized and consistent implementation of measures 
dealing with gas supply problems, it did not have much to do with solidarity among the 
member states beyond what could be done on voluntary, bilateral basis.
99
However, 
changes have happen in the content of energy policies, some institutional innovations 
were brought as well. 
If we would look at the institutional changes after the Lisbon treaty, new 
significant players appeared in the field. First of all, changes in the European Council. 
This institution defines interest and decisions concerning a specific country or in 
thematic areas such as energy.
100
The treaty introduces new figure in this institution – 
president of European Council. This person will have the driving seat and basically 
have the agenda setting powers. From 2009 this office is held by former Belgian Prime 
Minister Herman Van Rompuy. Some observer argue that he has created political 
momentum and added much-desired political face next to the more technocratic aspects 
of negotiation on energy.
101
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Looking at the Commission, the main novelty is new DG ENER
102
 which 
supposed to abolish problems arising from overlaps and gaps in the Commission 
governance of energy policies. This innovation should also improve the level of 
expertise in the field of energy as well as fasten the process of policy formation. It is 
also important to mention that external dimension of energy fall under the mandate of 
Energy Commissioner. On the other hand, not everything is so easy. In the EU’s 
external representation for further cooperation with non-EU countries and regions, 
different format for negotiations was chosen. There is triple negotiators system: the high 
representative (also a new figure established in the Lisbon treaty), energy commissioner 
flanked by the Presidency of the Council of European Union.
103
 This multiple 
representation is in the external affairs is useful as energy is closely interconnected with 
other policies such as climate change and biodiversity, trade and etc. But this system 
might also cause some problems as it is not clear who should take the lead in energy 
based negotiations. No significant changes were made in the work of Council of 
ministers in the treaty. While European Parliament can enjoy more powers in decision 
making process. The introduction of Article 218(6a) TFEU on the conclusion of 
international agreements is however more important for enhancing the Parliament’s role 
in energy matters.
104
 In the agreements that are related to the ordinary legislative 
procedure the consent of European Parliament is now necessary. This means that in 
energy projects which are of European importance, such as Nabucco or Southern 
Corridor, no agreement can be made without permission of EP.  In general the 
institutional changes brought by Lisbon treaty are welcomed as now Union is looking at 
energy matters beyond the internal market and tries to give more political profile to the 
external dimension. In this regard new positions of president of European Council and 
High Representative should play a significant role.
105
 On the other hand, international 
representation in energy policy has become more complex and not necessary more 
effective, confusion among different veto player might turn to competition and disturb 
decision making in the energy field.  
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To sum up, after Lisbon treaty came into force Commission tried to put 
energy policies in the top level of EU agenda, however because of turbulent situation in 
the world and economic crisis it had to step back. On the other hand some significant 
decisions were made. Institutional setting changed as well, mostly in the external energy 
policies. In the next chapter we will try to see how all these legal and political changes 
work in practice and what impact it has on states energy security, looking at the case 
study of Lithuania.  
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4. Effect of Post-Lisbon energy policies to Lithuania’s energy security 
 
This chapter will analyzes the possible effect of EU common energy policy 
to Lithuania’s energy security using Traffic Light Model. This analysis will give the 
answer to the research question of this thesis and show how Union policies reflect 
Lithuania’s policy preference. Step by step all the energy security risk will be discussed 
showing the changes related to EU policies. 
4.1 Intolerable Risks 
 
As already showed it the Figure 1.2 there are two types of energy security 
risk which cause particular danger to Lithuanian energy security: dependence on single 
supplier and lack of transparency, experience and competence. These risks have a high 
possibility of occurrence and the extent of consequences might be rather big.   
Let’s start with the first one. Dependence on single supplier is Lithuania’s 
historical heritage form long years being a part of Soviet Union and belonging to its 
single network. And as it has been experience in the past very often this can be used as a 
political tool. To escape this situation more energy connection should be established 
between Lithuania and western and northern members of the Union. Here energy 
infrastructure project plays a very important role. 
Before Lisbon treaty EU had a TEN-E program which is still being 
conducted, with the budget of 155 million euros for the period 2007-2013. This program 
was established in the last decade of 20
th
 century when Commission prepared 
benchmarks and financial regulation and set TEN-E policy. It has four main goals: 1) 
support the formation of internal market, 2) reduce isolation of the region which are in 
adversity, 3) ensure and diversify energy supply in the ES in cooperation with the third 
countries, 4) promote sustainable development and environment protection. This policy 
involves electricity, gas and alkene transmission grids. Unfortunately, EC in its 
Communication on energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond confirmed the 
necessity to revise the TEN-E policy and financing framework. The need for a new 
46 
 
method to identify projects of common interest was required.
106
 It is obvious that this 
program did not manage to reach its goals, especially in Baltic Sea region. TEN-T 
program with its limited focus on grants for feasibility studies and lack of adequate risk 
reduction instruments is not suitable for future development of EU energy 
infrastructure.  
Post- Lisbon agenda introduced new ways of improving the situation in 
the field of infrastructure. In this matter very important was already mentioned 
European Council meeting in February 2011. Heads of governments then agreed that 
‘The internal market should be completed by 2014 so as to allow gas and electricity to 
flow freely’ and what is very good news for Lithuania, they announced that ‘No EU 
Member State should remain isolated from the European gas and electricity networks 
after 2015 or see its energy security jeopardized by the lack of the appropriate 
connections’.107 It seems that Member States managed to reach an agreement and thus 
more attention to improved infrastructure will be given in the future.  
In practice these statements became a Regulation with new financial 
instrument, which should provide means of financing adequate for current need of the 
energy sector. The Regulation on Guidelines for trans- European Energy infrastructure 
covers electricity transmission lines, storage, smart grids at both transmission and 
distribution level, gas high pressure pipelines, storage LNG/CNG.
108
 The overall the 
aim of this Regulation is to ensure that 12 priority corridors and areas that have been 
identified will be implemented in timely fashion. 
109
The new financial tools were 
introduced in order to reach this aim. 
 EC presented regulation which established Connecting Europe Facility 
(CEF) under which a total of 50 billion euro would be committed in 2014-2020 
investments in Europe’s transport, energy, and digital network improvements. Almost 
9.1 billion euro will be given to the energy infrastructure projects. That is the biggest 
amount ever given to the energy projects. It is also important to note that this is the first 
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time that, upon creating a centralized mechanism, the EU will finance the creation of 
large- scale energy infrastructure from budgetary funds.
110
 This could be named as a 
perfect example how aims established in the treaty of Lisbon are implemented and 
principle of solidarity is strengthened in practice. Now such small states as Lithuania 
have a chance to improve their infrastructure.  
Lithuania’s intentions here are quite obvious – to implement energy 
infrastructure projects that would integrate its energy grids into the EU energy grids and 
systems and help eliminate the country’s energy isolation as well as ensure the security 
and reliability of the energy supply.
111
 The problem with such projects is that most often 
they are not commercial attractive, in order to be implemented it is necessary to secure 
EU financial support. In this way support from this new facility will be given only to 
those projects that cannot give any economical return. Moreover, money form CEF will 
be given to projects which are dealing with high priority energy corridors and fields. In 
general European Commission set three criteria which have to be fulfilled in order to get 
financial support: 1) the strengthening and integration of the internal EU energy market, 
2) increasing supply security, and 3) sustainable development and environmental 
protection. It is also important to note that regional criteria should be implemented, that 
means the project should be beneficial to at least two member states.
112
 
It can be observed that all these criteria are very convenient for Lithuania. 
They narrow down the list of possible projects to be financed and put Lithuanian 
projects on the top of the list. Such projects as the gas link between Lithuania and 
Poland or second electric power link Lithuania and Poland would fulfill most of the 
criteria they would improve supply security and reduce market concentration. What is 
more, these projects would be beneficial not only for these two countries, all Baltic 
regions would beneficial. CEF is giving states with very constrained financial recourse 
an opportunity to increase their levels of energy security. One of these project is already 
being implemented.  
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LITPOL link is a project supported by EU financial resources. It is 
building the electricity grids connecting Lithuania and Poland with the Western Europe 
electricity system. According to the free market rules, the direction of the energy 
supplies will be determined by the needs of each country. For instance, the possible 
shortage of energy in the Baltic Sea region, after the decommissioning of the Ignalina 
Nuclear Power Plant, is going to be compensated by the energy import. LITPOL Link is 
expected to fully operate by the end of 2015. Implementation of this project would 
mean the creation of common Baltic market.  
However, two problems might rise during the process of using the tools 
given by the EU. The first one is closely related to the second intolerable risk, there is 
possibility that Lithuania will not be able to use this given opportunity, because of the 
lack of experience and expertise. The encouraging fact is that Lithuania already has 
experience in implementing similar project. 131 million euro grant from the European 
Energy Program for Recovery allowed beginning implementation of NordBalt project 
linking Lithuanian and Swedish electricity grids. Second problem is related to the 
regional profile of the projects in the CEF. As it was in the past separate countries could 
as for EU support for similar projects, now it became not possible. Projects have to be 
prepared not by the governments but by regional groups. Lithuania should not have any 
problems with their neighbors Latvians or Estonians; however the most important ally 
at the moment should be Poland. And the relations with this country are quite 
complicated because of the Polish minority issues in Lithuania. This problem will be 
discussed in more detailed in the next chapter.  
In general it can be claimed that EU is creating instrument that would 
allow Lithuania to increase the level of connections with western and northern 
neighbors and increase the level of energy security. What is more financial support for 
energy infrastructure would allow Lithuania abolish the acceptable energy security risk. 
Vulnerable energy infrastructure in the country should be fixed as the international 
connection is hardly possible with old and limited grids. New projects should also take 
into account renovation of local electricity and gas transmission lines. Moreover, 
European Union has created more means to strengthen Lithuania’s energy system 
independence.  
49 
 
One more EU decision that would increase Lithuanian energy 
independence is Council and Parliament regulation Nr. 994/2010 on security of gas 
transition, the purpose of this regulation is to secure means which would ensure 
uninterrupted gas supply, especially in case of difficult climate condition or supply 
disturbance. In order to reduce the impact of potential crises triggered by the disruption 
of gas supplies states should facilitate the diversification of energy sources and gas 
delivery routes and supply sources. In simple words that mean that Member States has 
to make sure that there would be at least two sources of gas supply. Member States has 
to take necessary measures no later than December 3th, 2014.
113
 It is important to note 
that regulation is legally binding document and all member states has to implement it. 
This means that Lithuania has to find another source for gas supply. 
Building new infrastructural objects would be most probably the only way out to avoid 
possible EU sanctions for noncompliance with Regulation. Of course Lithuania could 
take the easy decision and import gas from Latvia, but from the same Gazprom, this 
could be considered as a second option, however it would not reach the goal of the 
regulation.
114
 Government of Lithuania had the same opinion. May 2012 Government 
approved the law which gave the start to the building of LNG (liquefied natural gas) 
terminal in Klaipeda. This would allow Lithuania to improve infrastructure and import 
gas not only through pipelines from Russia, but would have many other import options. 
Before this Baltic States including Lithuania are very dependent on Russian recourses, 
gas as the primer energy resource in Lithuania has 30 percent of the market, while EU 
average is 6, 5 percent.
115
 This mean that in case of problems with infrastructure or 
political conflict Lithuania would face major difficulties in ensure state security.  It is 
important to note that Regulation No. 994 pays much attention to energy island, such as 
Baltic States. Article 6 oblige these countries to creative alternative gas supply 
possibilities until the December 3th According to the Lithuanian energy security 
evaluation study which was made by Energy Security Research Center to evaluate 
period 2007 – 2011, project building LNG terminal in Lithuania would increase its 
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energy security levels by 6 percent
116
. Looking from the energy security point of view 
this would increase its levels. However some economic questions should be taken into 
account. 
The important issue here might be the price for the gas; however it has 
been counted that after building the LNG terminal price should drop by 10-20%
117
. 
Because of its dependence on single supplier Lithuania today is paying bigger price then 
the market price. You can see the difference shown in the Scheme No. 2At the moment 
there 16 companies that are participating in the competition for importing LNG to 
Lithuania, this gives a solid ground for negotiation on the prices. What is more, brining 
competition to Lithuanian gas market might cause the drop of Gazprom gas prices as it 
no longer be the only gas provider in the state. On the other hand reliance on the gas 
markets might bring instability in the energy sector, because of the fluctuation in the 
prices. This means that any accident in the market (for example severe weather, 
operating mishaps, or planned maintenance) can cause sudden increase in gas prices 
because of the uncertainty of supplies. However, European Union has created a tool for 
its member states to avoid these possible threats coming from the market. It is called 
Third Party Access (TPA) Exemption which mainly states that some new investments, 
particularly cross border gas pipelines and LNG terminals, as well as cross border 
electricity interconnectors can be particularly risky. If, exceptionally, such projects 
cannot be realized if the rules on third party access, tarification, congestion rents or 
(since 3 March 2011) ownership unbundling were applied, national regulators may 
"exempt" them entirely or partially from the respective rules of the EU energy acquis 
for a timely limited period.
118
 In this case it gives the member state a way to deal with 
problems that may rise because of opening its national market to the international 
market. Until now Lithuania has not asked for any exemption, however building a 
pipeline with Poland might require one, but this project at the moment is only in the 
initial stage, that is why evaluation of TPA exemption is hardly possible. 
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The other issue related to the building of LNG is its cost efficiency, as 
building a terminal is an expensive action
119
 and it requires big investment, as well as 
the cost of transaction should be taken into account. It is a considerable burden for such 
a small country as Lithuania. Despite that, it seems that building LNG is more 
geopolitical decision, Lithuania is acting according to “willing- to- pay120” principal 
were the main goal is to reduce dependence on Russian resources. Even not knowing all 
the economic outcomes state is willing to pay for the project to reach their independent. 
Taking into account all these considerations, the argument is that despite 
some inaccuracies EU is in accordance with Lithuania’s preferences in Union’s 
common energy policy, giving the right tools to increase its energy security. However, 
all the actions might not reach desirable result because of the situation in Lithuania.  
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This might happen because of the lack of high quality expertise in this 
field as well as not efficient experience. Corruption even though not being in the 
alarming levels can cause some problems as well. Lithuania has already experienced 
how lacking of knowledge and experience might cause loss of the EU funds. Energy 
sector is not an exception here. European Court of Audit has criticized Lithuania for its 
inability to use EU funds effectively. Recent report stated that Lithuania as a country 
receiving largest contributions from the Cohesion Fund and European Regional 
Development Fund for energy efficiency measures for the 2007-2013 programming 
period did not managed to fulfill its obligations. The audit concluded that the right 
conditions in programming and financing had not been set to enable cost effective 
energy efficiency investments, and the audited energy efficiency projects in public 
buildings were not cost effective.
121
 More monitoring was recommended and new 
measures for project evaluation were set. In this particular case Lithuania lost its status 
as a reliable partner and future financing possibilities were minimized. Thinking that 
such audit result would change situation in Lithuania would be misleading, as this was 
not the first time similar situation happened before and government did not take 
necessary measures for situation to improve. It seems that more EU monitoring does not 
have any effect on Lithuanian institutions as one of interviewers stated: “Anyone else 
expect us cannot fix this, there has to be a need from the government to do that. It is 
important to involve experts that have sufficient knowledge about this sector, because 
we have to admit that gas is not a simple good. And that is not the first and most 
probably not the last time Lithuania receives negative remarks from Brussels. Every 
new minister just tries to deny all these critiques instead of fixing the situation.”122 
Moreover, that is not the only problem here. Even lacking expertise in this 
field government institutions somehow neglect the possible help from the experts in 
energy field. The situation now can be called as confrontational as for the first time 
since 1994 when it was established Lithuanian energy institute was not invited to 
participate preparing Lithuania’s energy strategy. Most of the energy experts are talking 
publically about government unwillingness to take into consideration their opinion. This 
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situation turns out to be one of the reasons why referenda for the new nuclear power 
plant resulted in such a big opposition in the society. Ignoring opinion of the experts 
resulted in big dissatisfaction in the society. 
To conclude this sub-chapter it can be argued that European Union had 
taken few major steps to improve to situation in the field of energy. If using all the tools 
given and implementing regulations Lithuania should become less dependent on single 
supplier and increase their level of energy security. On the other hand economic factors 
should be taken into account, as well as, the lack of experience and knowledge might 
impede the process. And ignoring the result of audits and not letting energy experts to 
participate will not improve the situation. In the economic sphere price and transaction 
risk should be taken into account when establishing new infrastructure and 
interconnections.  
4.2 Tolerable risks 
 
This chapter will deal with risks that need to be abolished, yet over a 
longer period of time than the intolerable risks. The extent of consequences in the 
Tolerable risk groups is lower than in the previous one. In Lithuania’s case three such 
risks were defined and each of them is somehow related to the EU agenda.  
The first one, vertical integration of the energy sector is a risk that should 
be automatically eliminated with the “Third Package” being fully implemented. The 
term “Third Package” or “Third Energy Package” refers to the package of EU 
legislation on electricity and gas markets that entered into force on 3
rd
 September 2009. 
The purpose of this legislation is to further liberalise European energy markets. This 
package is composed of two directives concerning rules in regard to common gas 
(2009/73/EC) and electricity (2009/72/EC) markets, and three regulations: on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks (715/2009), on conditions 
for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity (714/2009) and the 
establishment of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulations (713/2009). EU 
member states had 18 months until 3
rd
 March 2011 to transfer these two directives to 
their national legislation. This package is important because it basically states the 
unbundling of the gas and electricity sectors. This would suppose an effective 
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separation between the operation of electricity and gas transmission networks from 
supply and generation activities. Lithuania was one of most active supporters of the 
Third Package implementation and has chosen the most radical to do that. 
Government of the country decided that implementing the Directive would 
be more beneficial to the country that to negotiate on derogation. Lithuania announced 
that it would divide its company “Lietuvos Dujos” into a gas distribution network and 
gas sale companies, the latter of which would be controlled by the government. 
Lithuania was the first of the Baltic States to have started the implementation of this 
Directive. This can be explained by the fact that Lithuania is paying approximately 15 
proc. bigger price for natural gas than other Baltic States and taking such radical steps 
might be perceived as an attempt to influence and force Gazprom to reduce the 
prices.
123
 However, “Gazprom” being a shareholder of the company was not satisfied 
with the decision and claims that the Lithuanian government is using the EU decision 
for nationalising the company.  
On the other hand, the comments from Brussels are encouraging; it has 
been noticed that Lithuania could constitute an example for other member states on how 
to reform their energy sectors. Commissioner Gunther Oettinger appreciated Lithuania’s 
efforts to reorganize its gas sector according to EU regulations. In the meeting with the 
Lithuanian minister of Energy on 7
th
 September 2010 he stated “Our common goal is to 
protect the interest of consumers. We value your way of dealing with reform in gas and 
electricity sectors”. 124 
Receiving strong support from the European Commission, Lithuania took 
further steps to liberalise its gas sector. In summer 2011 Lithuania’s Parliament adopted 
a law on natural gas. This law provided an action plan according to which the EU Third 
Energy Package should have become a reality. On 8
th
 October 2011 the Lithuanian 
government approved plan to divide “Lietuvos dujos”. According to this plan, the 
company would have to be divided by the end of October 2014.  Before this was 
announced, an action plan was discussed in Brussels with representatives from 
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European Commission and the German company “E.ON”, which is a shareholder in the 
company. In the meantime, “Gazprom” was ignoring the process.  
Non participation of this company in the negotiations was unwelcomed as 
unbundling may only be implemented having consent between all interested parties. 
However, if this scenario is not possible, the company will be reorganized in accordance 
to Lithuanian law. Three new companies would be established, while the share of stocks 
in these companies would be divided proportionally according to the share in “Lietuvos 
dujos”. Nonetheless, shareholders would lose their right to vote in some of the 
companies. Lithuania’s interest here is well defined: the government seeks to have 
control over the gas transmission operator, the company which will administer gas 
pipelines in Lithuania. 
Fortunately, no legal measures had to be taken as in the end of May 2012 
shareholders of “Lietuvos dujos” including Gazprom has reached an agreement on 
unbundling of the company according to the EU standards. 
If every step is taken as planned, Lithuania should reach the 
implementation of Third Energy Package, which implies that the aim of market 
liberalisation will be accomplished and the monopolistic nature of country’s market will 
be reduced. However, it is not evident yet how this Directive will influence Lithuania’s 
energy system, taking into account the fact that previous two directives did not bring 
expected result. Moreover, the decision to choose the most radical way from 
implementation was a matter of discussion in Lithuania. There was expressed concern 
about relations with Gazprom and lost possibility to negotiate on the lower prices. Some 
experts doubt about the practical result of this directive. This idea was expressed by the 
expert for the NATO energy security centre of excellence: “I think the main goal of this 
Directive was to build a competition in a gas sector, in order to decrease the gas prices 
and ensure reliable resource supply. But if Lithuania wants to achieve all these goals 
decomposing of one company would not give these results.”125 This basically states that 
even implementing the Third Energy Package would not secure the creation of a market. 
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To sum up what this energy risk entails, the conclusion can be made that 
the EU has given Lithuania an opportunity to change the situation in their gas sector and 
avoid the situation of vertical integration. On the other hand, further practical evaluation 
would be only possible after 2014. Even though the Third Energy Package entails 
enough legal significance to improve the level of energy security, the practical benefits 
are, unfortunately, dubious. On the other hand some EU policies outperform. 
In the field of renewables Lithuania is doing much better. This is 
important for a few particular reasons, but mostly because of the fact that the 
development of renewable energy sources (RES) increases the total amount of energy 
generated in the country. It is also significant because of the diversification of energy 
sources, which consequently reduces the demand of imported energy and the 
dependence on countries exporting energy resources.
126
 Lithuania is one of the leaders 
in this field in the EU; it reached a 15.2% increase in usage in 2010. EU financial and 
political support should ensure that sufficient progress is taking place. Lithuania’s law 
on renewable energy resources raises three main objectives. Firstly, to increase the share 
of electricity generation from renewable energy sources by no less than 20% by 2020. 
Secondly, the share of the centralized heating supply from renewable energy sources is 
planned to be increased by no less than 60% by 2020, while the share of renewable 
energy sources for the heating of households – by no less than 80%. Finally, the 
government is planning to increase the consumption of biofuel by no less than 10% in 
all types of transport before 2020.
127
Lithuania possesses a well-established legal base to 
continue the development of renewables. Significant achievement has been reached in 
the usage of biofuels, wind and solar energy, wood and wooden waste. It goes without 
saying that the law on renewables was made in accordance to the recommendations of 
the European Union and specifically with the Directive 2009/28/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources. This directive establishes a common framework for the 
production and promotion of energy from renewable sources. It is part of a package of 
energy and climate change legislation which provides the legislative framework for 
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Community targets concerning greenhouse gas emission savings. Member states have to 
establish action plans to set the share of renewable energy in the state, apart from having 
to build the necessary infrastructure for energy from renewable sources in the transport 
sector.
128
 But as in the gas sector, the economic questions should be taken into account. 
Energy received from renewable sources is more expensive than 
traditional sources; thus, the introduction of renewables into the market is complicated.  
This Directive provides for individual promotion instruments concerning the selection 
of renewable energy sources in each country. Lithuania has chosen a fixed tariff as a 
promotion measure aimed at supporting investments. Fixing the price with reference to 
the production costs creates conditions for diversifying tariffs by production 
technologies. This promotion measure ensures a long-term and stable income for 
producers, thus reducing the risks pertaining investment and the possibility of a 
precipitate increase in the prices of the generated electricity. This measure aims to 
motivate the producers in reducing energy production costs and encourage technological 
innovations.
129
In general all programmes aimed at the promotion of renewables are 
supported by EU funds (EU Structural Funds, Rural development Programmes). For 
example, for the period 2007-2013 m. Lithuania received 239 928 435 Lt (approx.70 
million euros) for projects related to renewable energy from the Cohesion Fund. 
Financial support from the EU is a major factor concerning Lithuania’s good 
performance in this field. This is an important step as evolution of renewables market is 
particularly important to further development of independent energy sector in this 
country. 
In Lithuania renewables are perceived as a way of diversification in the 
energy market and decreasing dependence on a single supplier, as well as creating 
competition between companies. Investments in renewable energy should result in the 
de-monopolization of the energy sector, which would therefore minimize the energy 
security risk. However, the situation is controversial; the same monopolies might be 
created in the sphere of renewable energy. To obtain necessary resources for the 
production of the renewable energy can be complicated. If we look at the market of 
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biofuels in Lithuania, there are only few companies who produce it, entrance of other 
actors is hardy possible. In this way situation is created when the monopoly of biofuel 
energy is created and the security levels of the state are threaten by the risks of secure 
supply and lack of competition. “If we think that biofuel is easy to produce, and 
everyone who wants can to that, we are mistaken. There are two – three companies 
which produce biofuel at this sector as well as in electricity; we should not expect a 
decrease in prices as well. Companies seeing the prices of natural gas will not be 
interested in decreasing their prices; the best scenario is price drop by 5%.”130The other 
problem with renewables is that, despite the fact that Lithuania is one of the leaders in 
the EU in using this kind of energy, this result was reached using biofuels. This type of 
energy is not a ‘real’ renewable energy, as its sources can dwindle, and Lithuania has 
merely developed a low level of solar, wind or water energy usage. Recent troubles with 
the development of solar power plants and issues with the financing of new projects 
have shown that there are still problems which need to be solved. However, if the 
implemented policies have positive effects on Lithuania’s energy security risks, the 
positive influence of the EU’s decision will surely be observed. The use of financial 
support now depends on national authorities and whether they will manage to use the 
opportunity suitably. Evaluation: EU policies increase the level of energy security in 
using renewables. 
Taken into account all tolerable risks, the conclusion can be made that the 
EU establishes a good basis for improvement in the gas sector by attempting to avoid 
monopolistic situations in this sector. Some improvements are visible in field of 
renewable energies, which also improves Lithuania’s levels of energy security. Even 
though there are some issues in this sector they do not overshadow the benefits.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
This work aimed at finding out whether the European Union was acting as 
an agent fulfilling Lithuania’s as a principal preferences in the energy security. The 
intent of this research was to analyze how EU common energy policy influences 
Lithuania’s energy security risks after Lisbon treaty came into force.  
The first two chapters have created a theoretical framework which 
established a base for the empirical findings of the thesis. Rational Choice 
Institutionalism is a theory which defines the relations between the state and the 
institution; in this case, between EU and Lithuania. This theory is particularly 
important, as the main goal of the thesis is to examine how these relations influence the 
member state’s energy security. Despite a few shortcomings, this approach has led to a 
research model that contributes to answering the main question in this thesis. 
The research model chose was the Traffic Light Model of tolerable, 
intolerable and acceptable risks. It helped to clearly define factors which led to the 
evaluation of EU policies regarding Lithuania’s energy security level. The Traffic Light 
Model is useful in that it demonstrates which energy security risks, when demolished, 
lead to higher levels of energy security in Lithuania. Two main groups of risks were 
determined. Tolerable risks are those that, although they pose a danger to the state’s 
energy security in high levels, should be dealt with by means that can be implemented 
—within reasonable limits— over a longer period of time. Intolerable risks are the ones 
that can bring the biggest damage to state’s energy security if not minimized as soon as 
possible. 
The third section of this thesis was describing the main novelties brought 
by Lisbon treaty and its practical evaluation in the EU. This was done in order to define 
main policies that took place in this period and how they may influence energy security 
of the member state. 
After careful analysis in the empirical part, the main finding of this thesis 
is that EU common energy policy has a positive influence on Lithuania’s energy 
security. It can be argued that the European Union’s actions are minimizing energy 
security risks in this country. The Union has been acting as an agent fulfilling 
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principals’ preferences, even though most of the policies were regulations sent from 
Brussels, all of them were in accordance with Lithuania’s energy policy priorities.  
The analysis of the tolerable type of risks has shown that EU as the agent 
has created conditions in Lithuania for increasing its energy security, and particularly in 
creating conditions for the better usage of innovations in the energy sector by using 
renewable. The question of how the vertical integration of companies would be 
minimized and single market created by the Third Energy Package is not clear yet, but 
Lithuania has support from Brussels, which should encourage further actions.  
The situation with intolerable risks is positive. In view of the country’s 
dependence on a single supplier, the European Union has given Lithuania legal and 
financial tools to decrease this risk. For example, the Connecting Europe Facility should 
support major energy infrastructure projects in the Baltic States, including Lithuania.  
What is more, this would also reduce the acceptable risk (vulnerable infrastructure), as 
creating more connections with North and West European Union countries would mean 
a renovation of old infrastructure.  
Issue that is raised in this section is possible market risks that might be 
damaging states energy security. Lithuanian government is not taking into account all 
economic factors. Lithuania focuses on the political side of the energy security risks 
while the economic aspects are not given enough attention. The rationality of 
Lithuanian decision making is focused on political self-sufficiency aspect. In this way 
acting according to ‘willing-to-pay’ principal were the main goal is independence of its 
energy system. On the other hand EU suggests a tool for minimizing these risks 
introducing the TPA exemptions.  
However, another problem emerges concerning the competence of public 
officers that are working with energy projects. EU has no major influence on decision 
making and implementing in Lithuania, and more monitoring does not have any 
significant impact here. This issue might lead to the insufficient usage of given 
opportunities in establishing higher levels of energy security in the state.  
The overall final conclusion is that the EU as an agent is acting in 
accordance with Lithuania’s priorities in creating a common EU energy policy after the 
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Lisbon Treaty came into force by providing Lithuania with the necessary tools for 
increasing its energy security. The problem here is that the increase in national energy 
security would have better results if changes inside the country’ public sector would be 
implemented. 
As the given research model only tackles the political issues related to the 
state’s energy security, further research analysis should deal with the economic 
dimension of energy security in the EU politics, paying particular attention to the cost 
and benefit of building new infrastructure and how this could influence energy prices. 
Another topic that could be evaluated in future analyses would be the external factor of 
EU energy policies on the energy security of its member states; this topic is relevant 
considering that the Lisbon Treaty brought significant reforms in this field.  
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